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LOUISIANA

Blake Jones*
I. Introduction
In a microcosm of national and international trends in recent years,
Louisiana saw a policy tug of war between the oil and gas industry and
environmental advocates that shaped legal and legislative developments over
the course of the past year.
* Blake Jones is a member of the Energy Transactions practice group at Steptoe &
Johnson PLLC. He advises exploration and production companies through all phases of
acquisitions and divestitures, and regularly manages large title due diligence projects for his
clients. He is a graduate of The Ohio State University (BA), and Capital University (JD). Mr.
Jones is licensed in Ohio and Texas.
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II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
A. State Legislative Developments
1. Proposed Constitutional Amendment: Property Tax Exemption for
Goods Bound for the Outer Continental Shelf
During the 2019 Regular Session, House Bill 234 was sent to the Secretary
of State after passing by a vote of 83 to 12 in the Louisiana House of
Representatives, and by a vote of 91 to 4 in the Senate.1 As a result, the
citizens of Louisiana will go to the polls on October 12, 2019, to determine
whether to amend the State Constitution to extend the ad valorem tax
exemption for raw materials, goods, commodities, and other property to
property destined for the Outer Continental Shelf.2
If passed, Article VII, Sections 21(D)(2) and (3) of the Constitution of
Louisiana, would be amended relative to ad valorem tax exemption for,
“[r]aw materials, goods, commodities, and other articles being held on the
public property of a port authority, on docks of any common carrier, or in a
public or private warehouse, grain elevator, dock, wharf, or public storage
facility in this state for export to a point outside the states of the United
States.”3 The Amendment then goes on to specifically include goods bound
for the outer continental shelf. “For purposes of this Paragraph, ‘being held’
shall include raw materials, goods, commodities and other articles stored in
Louisiana for maintenance or until ready for use with a destination to the
Outer Continental Shelf.”4
The Amendment is supported by the oil and gas industry, including the
Louisiana Oil and Gas Association (“LOGA”), whose President, Gifford
Briggs, stated that the proposed Amendment will provide clarity for
Louisiana’s offshore operators, “LOGA worked hand in hand with Rep.
Blake Miguez to provide some clarification to the tax code. Due to a 'unique'
interpretation of Louisiana tax codes, oil companies in three parishes have
recently been assessed a property tax on goods that were previously not
taxed.”5

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

H.B. 234, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gifford Briggs, Roses and Thorns of the 2019 Session, LOUISIANA OIL & GAS
ASSOCIATION (June 25, 2019), https://www.loga.la/news-and-articles/roses-and-thorns-ofthen-2019-session (last visited July 18, 2019).
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2. Critical Infrastructure Law Amended to Prohibit Unauthorized Entry
to Pipelines
Effective August 1, 2018, Section 14.61 of the Louisiana Criminal Code
was revised to add oil and gas pipelines to the definition of critical
infrastructure.6 As a result, any person who, without authority to do so, enters
onto the premises of a pipeline that is completely enclosed by any type of
physical barrier, or who remains upon pipeline premises after having been
forbidden to do so,7 may be punished by imprisonment with or without hard
labor for not more than five years, and fined not more than one thousand
dollars, or both.8 The amendment defines a pipeline as “flow, transmission,
distribution, or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which transmit
or transport oil, gas, petrochemicals, minerals, or water in a solid, liquid, or
gaseous state.”9 The definition of critical infrastructure was also amended to
specifically include, “any site where the construction or improvement of any
facility or structure referenced in this Section is occurring.”10 Accordingly,
the statue protects the state’s existing pipelines, as well as pipeline
construction sites from unauthorized entry.
3. Bill Permitting Refineries and Industrial Plants to Self Report
Violations of Environmental Rules Fails in the House
House Bill 615 failed to pass in the House of Representatives after
receiving 46 yea votes, and 41 nay votes; falling short of the 53 votes required
to pass.11 The controversial bill that received national media coverage sought
to authorize “certain voluntary health, safety, and environmental audits by
facilities subject to regulation by the Department of Environmental
Quality.”12 The facilities covered by the proposed bill would have included
a pollution source or any public or private property or facility
where an activity is conducted which is required to be regulated
under this Subtitle and which does or has the potential to do any
of the following: (a) Emit air contaminants into the atmosphere.
(b) Discharge pollutants into waters of the state. (c) Use or control
radioactive materials and waste. (d) Transport, process, or dispose
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2019) (as amended by Act 692).
LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(A)(1) & (3) (2019).
LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(C) (2019).
LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(B)(3) (2019).
LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(B)(1) (2019).
H.B. 615, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
Id.
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of solid wastes. (e) Generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous wastes.13
In addition to permitting the voluntary audits, the information discovered
during said audits would have been privileged in civil and administrative
proceedings, except in certain circumstances.14 Additionally, owners and
operators would have been immune from administrative and civil penalties
for any disclosed violation identified in a voluntary audit.15 Tyler Gray, head
of the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, argued during
committee debate that the bill would create an environment in which
operators would self-report, and allow the Department of Environmental
Quality to focus on bad actors.16 Conversely, opponents of the bill and
environmentalists argued that the bill would have allowed the oil and gas
industry to regulate itself.17
B. State Regulatory Developments
1. Plugging Credits Incentivize Operators to Plug Abandoned Wells
The Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conversation, amended
Title 43, Part XIX, Section 104 of the Louisiana Administrative Code to
include the Plugging Credit Certificate Program.18 Under the program, “[a]
Plugging Credit may be applied to any new or existing well in lieu of
Financial Security required by Subsections A-H of this Section, on a 1 for 1
or 2 for 1 basis.”19 A single credit being awarded for plugging and restoring
the site of an orphan well after August 1, 2016, and one half of a credit
awarded for plugging and restoring an operator’s existing well that has been
inactive for a minimum of five years on or after August 1, 2016.20 One credit
can be applied to an existing or newly drilled well so long as said well is: (a)
in the same field as the plugged well; (b) is the same location type (land,
13. LA. STAT. ANN.§30:2004(8).
14. See H.B. 615, § (B).
15. Id. § (E).
16. Bill to shield some Louisiana environment violations fails, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May
16, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/da4a1f8e77ee4543ac725ed3ce4ac28c (last visited July
23, 2019).
17. Sam Karlin, Bill to keep Louisiana oil and gas industry's violations secret, immune
from penalties narrowly fails, THE ADVOCATE (May 16, 2019) https://www.theadvocate.
com/baton_rouge/news/politics/
legislature/article_7e6367de-7824-11e9-a53b-ef89fda3256f.html (last visited July 23, 2019).
18. 44 La. Reg. 2086 (November 20, 2018).
19. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 104(J)(1).
20. Id.
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inland water, or offshore) as the plugged well; and (c) has a total depth that
does not exceed 2000′ more than the total depth or plug back depth,
whichever is less, of the plugged well. (All depths TVD).21
2. Alternative Source Well Requirements
The Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conversation, amended
Title 43, Part XIX, Subpart 1 in order to condense rules and procedures from
several departments and to provide a single location for “a comprehensive
compilation of procedural requirements for permitting, construction,
operation, maintenance, plugging and abandonment of alternative source
wells.”22 The regulation defines an Alternative Source Well as, “a well that
produces water from a water-bearing stratum other than a ground water
aquifer, underground source of drinking water (USDW's), or at a depth or
location within a ground water aquifer containing water greater than 10,000
mg/l TDS.”23 The new chapter provides regulations for the permitting,
construction, maintenance, financial security, and plugging and
abandonment of Alternative Source Wells.24
C. Local Legislative Developments
There was no local Louisiana legislation to report on.
III. Judicial Developments
A. Federal Court Cases
1. Eastern District Remands Coastal Parish Lawsuits Against the Oil
and Gas Industry to State Court
The Parish of Plaquemines and other Louisiana coastal parishes filed a
total of 42 lawsuits in state court against more than 200 oil and gas companies
alleging that, “dredging, drilling, and waste disposal caused coastal land loss
and pollution” in violation of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act of 1978 (the “SLCRMA”).25 The SLCRMA provides a
cause of action against defendants that violate a state-issued coastal use
permit or fail to obtain a required coastal use permit.26 The plaintiffs solely
21. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 104(J)(4).
22. See 45 La. Reg. 575 (April 20, 2019).
23. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 805 (milligrams per liter of total dissolved solids).
24. See LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 801–829 (2019).
25. Parish of Plaquemines v. Riverwood Production Co., No. 18-5217, 2019 WL
2271118, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 2019)
26. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. §49:214.36(D)).
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argued the cause of action under the SLCRMA, and expressly disavowed any
potential federal claims that could have been brought under the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the Clean Water Act, federal regulations, or general maritime
or admiralty law.27 Despite the plaintiff’s disclaimers, defendants for a
second time removed the instant suit and similar suits to federal court,
invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction, the federal officer removal
statute, and the federal question statute.28
At the outset of the opinion, the court agreed with plaintiffs that
defendant’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The defendants
argued that they first learned that the case was removable on April 30, 2018,
when Plaintiff filed an expert report revealing pre-SLCRMA activities.29
However, the court agreed that plaintiffs had identified pre-SLCRMA in their
original petition in 2013, and that, at the latest, the 30 day removal period
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 was triggered on April 13, 2017.30 The court then
went on to address each of defendants jurisdictional arguments.
To assert federal officer jurisdiction, defendants must show that “(1) it is
a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1442; (2) it ‘acted pursuant to a federal
officer’s directions and that a causal nexus exists between its actions under
color of federal office and the plaintiff’s claims [or charged conduct;]’ and
(3) it has asserted a ‘colorable federal defense.’”31 Defendants argued that
the oil operator defendants and their predecessors were under federal
supervision and direction during World War II.32 The court disagreed,
holding that “none of these documents establish the type of formal delegation
that might authorize [the oil and gas companies] to remove the case.” 33 The
court found that federal officer jurisdiction as lacking because, “[t]hat the
defendants may have complied with some federal oversight directives during
WWII is precedentially insufficient to confer federal officer removal
jurisdiction. The private oil and gas industry’s wartime compliance with
federal laws or regulations falls short of being within the scope of ‘acting
under’ a federal official for acts ‘under color’ of such office.”34

27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *3.
29. Id. at *5.
30. Id. at *7.
31. Id. at *8 (quoting Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387, 400
(5th Cir. 1998)).
32. Id. at *11.
33. Id. at *14 (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142, 156 (2007)).
34. Id. at *17.
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The court then addressed federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”35 Cases
arise under federal law only if the well-pleaded complaint establishes either
that: (1) “federal law creates the cause of action[;]” or (2) “the plaintiff’s right
to relief [under state law] necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.”36 In rejecting defendants assertion of federal
question jurisdiction, the court noted that the defendants arguments were self
defeating because they previously argued (in their timeliness argument) that
the initial state court petitions did not reveal the existence of a federal
question.37 Defendants immediately appealed the remand order under their
federal officer removal predicate under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Fifth
Circuit currently has discretion to permit said appeal.
2. Operators Prohibited from Charging Unleased Mineral Owners for
Post-Production Costs
In a case of first impression, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana held that oil and gas operators are prohibited
from deducting post-production costs from an unleased mineral owner’s
(“UMO”) share of production.38 In doing so, the Court relied on a clear an
unambiguous reading of La. Rev. Stat. 30:10(A)(3), which states that a UMO
is entitled to be paid its tract’s “pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of
production.”39 The operator, Chesapeake Louisiana, LP (“Chesapeake”),
argued that the statute does nothing more than direct the time period within
which operators may pay a UMO. The Court disagreed and found that “this
statutory provision directs both when an unleased mineral owner is to be paid
and what he is to be paid – the payment of sales proceeds.”40 The Court also
noted that the Legislature drew a distinction between UMOs and other
nonparticipating working interest owners by using a broad and allencompassing definition of owners in Section 10(A)(2), while restricting the
application of Section 10(A)(3) to unleased owners.41 In it’s Motion for
35. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A § 1331 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-56)).
36. Id. (citing Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90
(2006)).
37. Id. at *18.
38. Johnson v. Chesapeake La., LP, No. 16-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. March
1, 2019).
39. Id. at *4 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN §30:10(A)(3) (2019)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Summary Judgment, Chesapeake made additional arguments based on unjust
enrichment and co-ownership; however, the Court refused to address said
arguments because, “the Legislature has provided a specific rule for this
situation.”42
B. Supreme Court Cases
There were no Louisiana Supreme Court decisions to report on.
C. Appellate Activity
1. Severance Taxes on Crude Oil Based on Gross Proceeds
In Avanti Exploration, LLC v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the Louisiana Department of Revenue (the
“Department”) erred in imposing severance taxes based on index pricing
rather than based on gross proceeds.43 Two of Avanti’s purchasers in armslength transactions remitted severance taxes to the Department based upon
the gross proceeds that Avanti received. The Department audited Avanti’s
records, and found that Avanti had impermissibly reduced its tax
computation by subtracting transportation costs, which were deducted from
Avanti’s gross proceeds pursuant to the two sales contracts.44 The Court
noted that under the relevant statute:
The severance tax is calculated on the producer's gross receipts on
sales or by the posted field price, whichever is higher. However,
if a producer incurs transportation costs in getting his product to
market, to a point of sale off the lease, he can subtract the
transportation costs from his gross receipts and calculate the
severance tax on the reduced amount.45
The Court ruled out the possibility that the Department used a posted field
price because “there was no traditional posted price in the field, which is
apparently a practice that has been in disuse for many years.”46 Further, the
Department offered no evidence to show how it arrived at its figures, and the
Court concluded that the Department erroneously added back the pricing
42. Id. at *5 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2019) (“When no rule for a particular
situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according
to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”)).
43. Avanti Expl., LLC v. Robinson, 268 So.3d 1093 (La. Ct. App. 2019).
44. Id. at 1095.
45. Id. at 1094 (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:633(7) (2019)).
46. Id. at 1097.
46. Id. at 1100.
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differential to the large market center indices contemplated in Avanti’s
contracts. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in the absence of a posted
field price, gross proceeds received by an operator must be used to calculate
an operator’s severance tax liability.
2. Coastal Use Permit Issued by the Department of Natural Resources
Upheld
On April 3, 2017, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
(“DNR”) issued a Coastal Use Permit (“CUP”) to Bayou Bridge Pipeline,
LLC (“Bayou Bridge”) for the construction of a petroleum pipeline from St.
Charles to St. James.47 Plaintiffs filed petitions for reconsideration with the
DNR, and the DNR denied their petition but addressed their concerns in a
written response. Plaintiffs then filed the instant action for judicial review
asserting that:
(1) DNR did not consider the potential adverse environmental
impacts of the proposed pipeline on St. James Parish; (2) DNR
ignored its constitutional and regulatory duties to consider the
cumulative impact of the proposed pipeline on St. James Parish;
(3) DNR ignored evidence that the people of St. James Parish may
be trapped in the event of an emergency with no viable evacuation
plan; and (4) DNR misapplied its own Guidelines.48
The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding that the DNR did not
apply Coastal Use Guidelines, and ordered Bayou Bridge to “to develop
effective environmental protection and emergency or contingency plans
relative to evacuation in the event of a spill or other disaster, in accordance
with guideline 719(K), PRIOR to the continued issuance of said permit.”49
DNR and Bayou Bridge appealed the judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed
the trial court, finding that: (i) the DNR’s conclusion that certain Coastal Use
Guidelines did not apply was not unreasonable or arbitrary; (ii) the DNR did
not fail to require effective environmental spill cleanup and emergency
response plans; (iii) the evidence supported a finding that the DNR satisfied
its constitutional public trust duty when issuing the CUP.50

47. Joseph v. Sec’y, La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 18-414 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/19); 265 So.3d
945, 947-948.
48. Id. at 948.
49. Id.
50. See generally, Joseph, 18-414 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/19); 265 So.3d 945.
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3. Deed Listing Well Names and Quarter-Section Property Descriptions
Sufficient to Place Third Parties on Notice
In 1977, Caroline Hunt (“Hunt”) inherited a fractional mineral interest in
and to a tract of land in Jackson Parish from her father. In 1988, Hunt filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Texas, and executed a deed as a part of the
bankruptcy proceedings in favor of R. Carter Pate, as Trustee, effective
January 8, 1990, and recorded in Jackson Parish on February 6, 1992.51 Said
deed conveyed:
the wells described on Exhibit “A” attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference for all purposes (collectively, the
“Wells” or singularly, a “Well”); and all mineral estates, mineral
leases, oil and gas leases, oil, gas, hydrocarbons and mineral
leases and other interests of any kind whatsoever in any mineral
estate, together with all oil, gas and other minerals produced
therefrom, whether known or unknown, metallic or nonmetallic,
common or unique (and the proceeds of the sale thereof),
including, without limitation, gravel, shale, lignite, sulphur, gold,
silver, lead, zinc, copper, iron, coal, gas, oil, casinghead gas, other
hydrocarbons, uranium, steam, geothermal energy and all other
minerals or substances and all royalty interests, overriding royalty
interests, net profits interests, production payments and similar
interests described in Exhibit “A”, any amendments, renewals,
extensions, replacements or modifications thereof, and each and
every kind and character of right, title, claim or interest which
Grantors have in and to the interests, properties and lands set forth
on Exhibit “A”, and any other surface estates, in the abovereferenced County and State as of the Effective Time (as
hereinafter defined)(collectively, the “Leases”). The description
of the Wells in Exhibit “A” and the description of the Leases in
Exhibit “A” are not intended to limit each other, it being the intent
of the Grantor and Grantee that this Deed convey every interest of
Grantor in and to the Leases described in Exhibit “A” irrespective
of whether the extent to which any Well is located on, includes or
is related in any such Lease, and that this Deed convey every
interest of Grantor in and to every Well described in Exhibit “A”

51. Compass Energy Operating, LLC v. Robena Prop. & Royalty Co., 52,468 (La.App. 2
Cir. 2/27/19); 265 So.3d 1160, 1162-63.
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irrespective of whether or the extent to which any such Well is
located on or related to any Lease.52
Exhibit “A” of the deed contained the following descriptions, and the deed
also specifically referenced the bankruptcy proceedings:53

Subsequently, on February 6, 1992, R. Carter Pate, as Trustee, conveyed
the mineral interests to several parties, including Robena Operating &
Royalty Company.54 In a separate chain of title, a deed recorded on October
1, 1997, stated that the mineral interest acquired by the United States from
Caroline Hunt was sold to Wayne Pender and A.O. Milstead, Jr. In yet
another chain of title, on January 12, 1998, Caroline Hunt and her mother’s
estate conveyed the mineral interest to Wayne Pender, Linda Blaylock
Pender, Andrew Ordell Milstead, Jr., and Florentina Rodriguez Milstead.
Dynex Royalties would acquire a mineral interest in the property through this
chain of title.55
Compass Energy Operating, LLC (“Compass”), the operator of a unit that
included the subject mineral interest filed a petition in concursus to resolve
the disputed mineral interest ownership, naming Robena Property & Royalty
Company, Ltd., Dynex Royalties, and the Milsteads as defendants. The
Milsteads prevailed at the trial court after arguing that Louisiana law required
the liquidating trust agreement to be recorded in Jackson Parish to own
immovable property there, and that the description in the Pate deed did not
provide adequate notice to third parties who acquired an adverse interest.
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Second Circuit held that the
liquidating trust agreement did not need to be recorded in Jackson Parish
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
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because it was a trust created under the authority of a United States
bankruptcy court--not under the Louisiana Trust Code, and because the deed
itself “clearly established from whence Pate's interest in the property
originated.”56 Next, the court held that the description in the Pate deed
satisfied the public records doctrine, as set forth by La. Civ. Code art. 3338:
Exhibit A lists wells in one column and then various property
descriptions in another column. Thus, to the right of the
“McDowell” well is the property description of “SW/4 Sec. 2,
SE/4 Sec. 3, NE/4 Sec. 10, NW/4 Sec. 11, all T-16-N, R-2-W.”
Within the SW/4 of Section 2 is the property at issue in this matter,
namely the E/2 of SE/4 of SW/4 of Section 2 in T-16-N, R-2-W.
Thus, Exhibit A clearly designates the property in which the Hunts
conveyed ‘every kind and character of right, title, claim, or
interest’ to Pate, that being the property at issue.57
Accordingly, the deed description was “sufficiently specific to place third
parties on notice of what had been conveyed.”58
4. Materialman’s Lien does not Affect New Leases Executed by Mineral
Servitude Owners
In Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations,
Inc., the owner of a mineral servitude sought a declaratory judgment from
the court declaring that an oil well lien did not encumber its mineral
servitude, or attach to a well located on the leasehold for which the
materialman did not furnish labor or equipment.59 Marlborough Oil & Gas,
L.L.C. (“Marlborough”) was the owner of the oil and gas servitude for the
leasehold upon which Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (“Baker
Hughes”) furnished labor, equipment, machinery, materials, and related
services to Northwind Oil & Gas, Inc (“Northwind”) in connection with its
operations on the Marlborough Oil & Gas, LLC No. 3 well.60 Northwind
failed to pay $412,415.64 owed to Baker Hughes for the goods and services
provided, and as a result, Baker Hughes recorded an “Oil Well Lien
Affidavit, Notice of Claim of Lien and Statement of Privilege” pursuant to
the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”), La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4861-4873.
56. Id. at 1167-68.
57. Id. at 1169.
58. Id.
59. See Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, Inc., 20180557 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/14/18); 367 So.3d 102.
60. Id. at 104.
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Baker Hughes then received summary judgment against Northwind and was
awarded the sum of the lien.61
Marlborough then filed its petition for declaratory judgment, and the trial
court held that the summary judgment in favor of Baker Hughes was “of no
legal effect or consequence, insofar and only insofar as to (1) [Marlborough],
its successors, lessees and assigns and (2) the mineral servitude owned by
[Marlborough] affecting the leased property as described in the judgment” or
as to the Marlborough No. 1 Well.62 Baker Hughes appealed the decision,
and the First Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that, “the
privilege granted [by the lien] is not restricted to the proceeds of the well
actually drilled, but rather exists on the entire lease as a whole,” and
therefore, the lien was effective as to both the Marlborough No. 3 Well and
the Marlborough No. 1 Well.63 The court then addressed Marlborough’s
claim that the lien created a cloud on its title–holding that no cloud existed
because Baker Hughes could only seize production pursuant to the operating
interest/lease under which Northwind operated, and thus, “any new lease
negotiated by Marlborough would not be affected by the Baker Hughes' lien
and judgment at issue herein.”64
D. Trial Activity
There were no Louisiana Trial Court orders to report on.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 105.
63. Id. at 107 (citing Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Serv’s, Inc., 657 So.2d 1307,
1312 (La. Ct. App. 1995)).
64. Id. at 109.
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